His power of drawing inferences, often
from seemingly unimportant trifles, was akin to that of the hunter of
his native backwoods, to whom the rustle of a twig, the note of a
bird, a track upon the sand, speak more clearly than written
characters. His estimate of the demoralisation of the Federal army
after Bull Run, and of the ease with which Washington might have been
captured, was absolutely correct. In the middle of May, 1862, both
Lee and Johnston, notwithstanding Jackson's victory over Milroy,
anticipated that Banks would leave the Valley. Jackson thought
otherwise, and Jackson was right. After the bloody repulse at Malvern
Hill, when his generals reported the terrible confusion in the
Confederate ranks, he simply stated his opinion that the enemy was
retreating, and went to sleep again. A week later he suggested that
the whole army should move against Pope, for McClellan, he said,
would never dare to march on Richmond. At Sharpsburg, as the shells
cut the trees to pieces in the West Wood, and the heavy masses of
Federal infantry filled the fields in front, he told his medical
director that McClellan had done his worst. At Fredericksburg, after
the first day's battle, he believed that the enemy was already
defeated, and, anticipating their escape under cover of the darkness,
he advised a night attack with the bayonet.
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