Moreover, the Federal Commander-in-Chief was so certain that Lee
would retreat that his deficiency in cavalry troubled him not at all.
He had determined to carry out his original design.
May 1.
The next morning--May 1--the right wing was to move by the plank road
and uncover Banks' Ford, thus still further shortening the line of
communication between the two wings; and as the chief of the staff
impressed on Sedgwick, it was "expected to be on the heights west of
Fredericksburg at noon or shortly after, or, if opposed strongly, at
night." Sedgwick, meanwhile, was "to observe the enemy's movements
with the utmost vigilance; should he expose a weak point, to attack
him in full force and destroy him; should he show any symptom of
falling back, to pursue him with the utmost vigour."* (* O.R. volume
25 page 306.)
But Hooker was to find that mere mechanical precautions are not an
infallible remedy for a dangerous situation. The Confederates had not
only learned long since the importance of concealment, and the
advantage of night marches, but in the early morning of May 1 the
river mists rendered both balloons and observatories useless. Long
before the sun broke through the fog, both McLaws and Jackson had
joined Anderson at Tabernacle Church, and a strong line of battle had
been established at the junction of the two roads, the pike and the
plank, which led east from Chancellorsville.
Pages:
1449
1450
1451
1452
1453
1454
1455
1456
1457
1458
1459
1460
1461
1462
1463
1464
1465
1466
1467
1468
1469
1470
1471
1472
1473