" Lee to Trimble, March 8, 1862. O.R. volume 25 part 2 page
658.) If Hooker had not moved Lee would have forestalled him. On
April 16 he had written to Mr. Davis: "My only anxiety arises from
the condition of our horses, and the scarcity of forage and
provisions. I think it is all important that we should assume the
aggressive by the 1st of May...If we could be placed in a condition
to make a vigorous advance at that time, I think the Valley could be
swept of Milroy (commanding the Federal forces at Winchester), and
the army opposite [Hooker's] be thrown north of the Potomac."* (*
O.R. vol 25 page 725.) Jackson, too, even after Hooker's plan was
developed, indignantly repudiated the suggestion that the forthcoming
campaign must be purely defensive. When some officer on his staff
expressed his fear that the army would be compelled to retreat, he
asked sharply, "Who said that? No, sir, we shall not fall back, we
shall attack them."
At the end of the month, however, Longstreet with his three divisions
was still absent; sufficient supplies for a forward movement had not
yet been accumulated;* (* "From the condition of our horses and the
amount of our supplies I am unable even to act on the defensive as
vigorously as circumstances might reguire.
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