Here, however, Hooker's communications with Aquia Creek were securely
covered by the Rappahannock, and so great was his preponderance of
strength, that he could easily detach a sufficient force to check the
Confederates should they move against them.
Yet now, as on the Antietam, Lee and Jackson declined to take numbers
into consideration. They knew that Hooker was a brave and experienced
soldier, but they had no reason to anticipate that he would handle
his vast masses with more skill than McClellan. That the Northern
soldiers had suffered in morale they were well aware, and while they
divined that the position they themselves had fortified might readily
be made untenable, the fact that such was the case gave them small
concern. They were agreed that the best measures of defence, if an
opening offered, lay in a resolute offensive, and with Hooker in
command it was not likely that the opportunity would be long delayed.
No thought of a strategic retreat, from one position to another, was
entertained. Manoeuvre was to be met by manoeuvre, blow by
counterblow.* (* "The idea of securing the provisions, waggons, guns,
of the enemy is truly tempting, and the idea has haunted me since
December.
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