Had Jackson been in Longstreet's place, the Secretary's proposal,
however promising of personal renown, would unquestionably have been
rejected. The leader who had kept the main object so steadfastly in
view throughout the Valley campaign would never have overlooked the
expressed wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Longstreet, however,
brilliant fighting soldier as he was, appears to have misconceived
the duties of a detached force. He was already prejudiced in favour
of a movement against Suffolk. Before he left for his new command, he
had suggested to Lee that one army corps only should remain on the
Rappahannock, while the other operated south of Richmond; and soon
after his arrival he urged upon his superior that, in case Hooker
moved, the Army of Northern Virginia should retire to the North Anna.
In short, to his mind the operations of the main body should be made
subservient to those of the detached force; Lee, with 30,000 men,
holding Hooker's 130,000 in check until Longstreet had won his
victory and could march north to join him. Such strategy was not
likely to find favour at headquarters. It was abundantly evident, in
the first place, that the Army of Northern Virginia must be the
principal objective of the Federals; and, in the second place, that
the defeat of the force of Suffolk, if it were practicable, would
have no effect whatever upon Hooker's action, except insomuch that
his knowledge of Longstreet's absence might quicken his resolution to
advance.
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