He knew too much of war and its
difficulties to expect that their judgment would be unerring. He
never made the mistake of reprehending the man who had done his best
to succeed, and contented himself with pointing out, quietly and
courteously, how failure might have been avoided. "But if he
believed," says his chief of the staff, "that his subordinates were
self-indulgent or contumacious, he became a stern and exacting
master; ...and during his career a causeless friction was produced in
the working of his government over several gallant and meritorious
officers who served under him. This was almost the sole fault of his
military character: that by this jealousy of intentional inefficiency
he diminished the sympathy between himself and the general officers
next his person by whom his orders were to be executed. Had he been
able to exercise the same energetic authority, through the medium of
a zealous personal affection, he would have been a more perfect
leader of armies."* (* Dabney volume 2 pages 519 to 520.)
This system of command was in all probability the outcome of
deliberate calculation. No officer, placed in permanent charge of a
considerable force, least of all a man who never acted except upon
reflection, and who had a wise regard for human nature, could fail to
lay down for himself certain principles of conduct towards both
officers and men.
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