They knew that the scope of the commander
is limited; that once his troops are committed to close action it is
impossible for him to exert further control, for his orders can no
longer reach them; that he cannot keep the whole field under
observation, much less observe every fleeting opportunity. Yet it is
by utilising opportunities that the enemy's strength is sapped. For
these reasons the Confederate generals were exceedingly careful not
to chill the spirit of enterprise. Errors of judgment were never
considered in the light of crimes; while the officer who, in default
of orders, remained inactive, or who, when his orders were manifestly
inapplicable to a suddenly changed situation, and there was no time
to have them altered, dared not act for himself, was not long
retained in responsible command. In the Army of the Potomac, on the
other hand, centralisation was the rule. McClellan expected blind
obedience from his corps commanders, and nothing more, and Pope
brought Porter to trial for using his own judgment, on occasions when
Pope himself was absent, during the campaign of the Second Manassas.
Thus the Federal soldiers, through no fault of their own, laboured
for the first two years of the war under a disadvantage from which
the wisdom of Lee and Jackson had relieved the Confederates.
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