In his earlier operations he gave his
generals every latitude, and be maintamed that loose but effective
system of tactics, in which much was left to the individual, adopted
by the French army just previous to the wars of the Revolution.) of
Washington, of Nelson, and of Wellington, and aware that their
strength would thus be doubled, McClellan and Pope did their best to
stifle it; and in the higher ranks they succeeded. In the one case
the generals were taught to wait for orders, in the other to
anticipate them. In the one case, whether troops were supported or
not depended on the word of the commanding general; in the other,
every officer was taught that to sustain his colleagues was his first
duty. It thus resulted that while the Confederate leaders were served
by scores of zealous assistants, actively engaged in furthering the
aim of their superiors, McClellan, Pope, and Fremont, jealous of
power reduced their subordinates, with few exceptions, to the
position of machines, content to obey the letter of their orders,
oblivious of opportunity, and incapable of co-operation. Lee and
Jackson appear to have realised the requirements of battle far more
fully than their opponents.
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