But, in the first place, the Federal tactics in attack were always
feeble. Lincoln, in appointing Hooker to command the Army of the
Potomac, warned him "to put in all his men." His sharp eye had
detected the great fault which had characterised the operations of
his generals. Their assaults had been piecemeal, like those of the
Confederates at Malvern Hill, and they had been defeated in detail by
the inferior numbers. The Northern soldiers were strangers to those
general and combined attacks, pressed with unyielding resolution,
which had won Winchester, Gaines' Mill, and the Second Manassas, and
which had nearly won Kernstown. The Northern generals invariably kept
large masses in reserve, and these masses were never used. They had
not yet learned, as had Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, that superior
numbers are of no avail unless they are brought into action,
impelling the attack forward by sheer weight, at the decisive point.
In the second place, none of the Federal leaders possessed the entire
confidence either of their generals or their troops. With all its
affection for McClellan, it may strongly be questioned whether his
army gave him credit for dash or resolution.
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