Over the six bridges his troops
had more lines of retreat than is usually the case when roads only
are available; and these lines of retreat were secure, protected from
the Confederate cavalry by the river, and from the infantry and
artillery by the batteries on the Stafford Heights. Had the battle
been fought on the North Anna, thirty-six miles from Fredericksburg,
the result might have been very different. A direct counterstroke
would possibly have been no more practicable than on the
Rappahannock, for the superior numbers of the enemy, and his powerful
artillery, could not have been disregarded. Nor would a direct
pursuit have been a certain means of making success decisive; the
rear of a retreating army, as the Confederates had found to their
cost at Malvern Hill, is usually its strongest part. But a pursuit
directed against the flanks, striking the line of retreat, cutting
off the supply and ammunition trains, and blocking the roads, a
pursuit such as Jackson had organised when he drove Banks from the
Valley, if conducted with vigour, seldom fails in its effect. And who
would have conducted such an operation with greater skill and energy
than Stuart, at the head of his 9000 horsemen? Who would have
supported Stuart more expeditiously than the "foot-cavalry" of the
Second Army Corps?
Lee's position at Fredericksburg, strong as it might appear, was
exceedingly disadvantageous.
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