The position had been occupied for defensive purposes alone. There
was no general reserve, no large and intact force which could have
moved to the attack immediately the opportunity offered. "No skill,"
says Longstreet, "could have marshalled our troops for offensive
operations in time to meet the emergency. My line was long and over
broken country, so much so that the troops could not be promptly
handled in offensive operations. Jackson's corps was in mass, and
could he have anticipated the result of my battle, he would have been
justified in pressing Franklin to the river when the battle of the
latter was lost. Otherwise, pursuit would have been as unwise as the
attack he had just driven off. It is well known that after driving
off attacking forces, if immediate pursuit can be made, so that the
victors can go along with the retreating forces pell-mell, it is well
enough to do so; but the attack should be immediate. To follow a
success by counter-attack against the enemy in position is
problematical."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 3 pages 82-3.)
Moreover, so large was the battle-field, so limited the view by
reason of the woods, and with such ease had the Federal attacks been
repulsed, that General Lee was unaware of the extent of his success.
Pages:
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314