But Lee
had that practical experience which Mr. Lincoln lacked, and without
which it is but waste of words to dogmatise on strategy. He was well
aware that a large army is a cumbrous machine, not readily deflected
from the original direction of the line of march;* (* On November 1
the Army of the Potomac (not including the Third Corps) was
accompanied by 4818 waggons and ambulances, 8,500 transport horses,
and 12,000 mules. O.R. volume 19 part 1 pages 97-8. The train of each
army corps and of the cavalry covered eight miles of road, or fifty
miles for the whole.) and, more than all, he had that intimate
acquaintance with the soldier in the ranks, that knowledge of the
human factor, without which no military problem, whether of strategy,
tactics, or organisation, can be satisfactorily solved. McClellan's
task, therefore, so long as he had to depend for his supplies on a
single line of railway, was not quite so simple as Mr. Lincoln
imagined.
Nevertheless, on November 7 Lee decided to unite his army. As soon as
the enemy advanced from Warrenton, Jackson was to ascend the Valley,
and crossing the Blue Ridge at Fisher's Gap, join hands with
Longstreet, who would retire from Madison Court House to the vicinity
of Gordonsville.
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