They were not so left, however, because it was
impossible to aid them. Jackson's and Longstreet's troops, despite
the fiery ordeal through which they had passed, were not yet
powerless, and the Confederate leaders were prepared for offensive
tactics. A sufficient force to sustain the right might have been
withdrawn from the left and centre; but Hill's approach was known,
and it was considered inadvisable to abandon all hold of the means
for a decisive counterstroke on the opposite flank. Early in the
afternoon Longstreet had given orders for an advance. Hood's
division, with full cartridge-boxes, had reappeared upon the field.
Jones' and Lawton's divisions were close behind; the batteries had
replenished their ammunition, and if Longstreet was hardly warranted
in arranging a general counter-attack on his own responsibility, he
had at least full confidence in the ability of the troops to execute
it. "It seemed probable," he says, "that by concealing our movements
under cover of the (West) wood, we could draw our columns so near to
the enemy to the front that we would have but a few rods to march to
mingle our ranks with his; that our columns, massed in goodly
numbers, and pressing heavily upon a single point, would give the
enemy much trouble and might cut him in two, breaking up his battle
arrangements at Burnside Bridge.
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