Except the divisions of
Hood and Walker, 5500 men all told, there was no immediate reserve.
But at daybreak on the 17th the troops which had been left at
Harper's Ferry were rapidly coming up. McLaws and Anderson, who had
started before midnight, were already nearing the Potomac; Hampton's
cavalry brigade was not far behind, and orders had been dispatched to
A.P. Hill. But could these 13,000 bayonets be up in time-before
Hooker and Mansfield received strong support, or before the Burnside
Bridge was heavily attacked? The question was indeed momentous. If
the Federals were to put forth their whole strength without delay,
bring their numerous artillery into action, and press the battle at
every point, it seemed hardly possible that defeat could be averted.
McClellan, however, who had never yet ventured on a resolute
offensive, was not likely, in Lee's judgment, to assault so strong a
position as that held by the Confederates with whole-hearted energy,
and it was safe to calculate that his troops would be feebly handled.
Yet the odds were great. Even after the arrival of the absent
divisions' no more than 35,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 194 guns
would be in line, and the enemy's numbers were far superior.
Pages:
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186