Confederate movements in Tennessee and
Kentucky had won a measure of success which bade fair to open up a
brilliant opportunity. Should the Federals be defeated in both the
theatres of war, the blow would be felt throughout the length and
breadth of the Northern States; and, in any case, it was of the
utmost importance that all McClellan's troops should be retained in
the East.
So, when the tidings came of Jackson's victory at Harper's Ferry,
both armies braced themselves for the coming battle, the Confederates
in the hope that it would be decisive of the war, the Federals that
it would save the capital. But the Confederates had still a most
critical time before them, and Lee's daring was never more amply
illustrated than when he made up his mind to fight on the Antietam.
McClellan's great army was streaming through the passes of the South
Mountain. At Rohrersville, six miles east of the Confederate
bivouacs, where he had halted as soon as the cannonade at Harper's
Ferry ceased, Franklin was still posted with 20,000 men. From their
battle-field at Turner's Gap, ten miles from Sharpsburg, came the
70,000 which composed the right and centre; and on the banks of the
Antietam but 15,000 Southerners were in position.
Pages:
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171