To recross the
Potomac would be to slight the favours of fortune, to abandon the
initiative, and to submit, in face of the vast numbers of fresh
troops which the North was already raising, to a defensive warfare, a
warfare which might protract the struggle, but which must end in the
exhaustion of the Confederacy. McClellan's own words are the
strongest justification of the views held by the Southern leaders:--
"The Army of the Potomac was thoroughly exhausted and depleted by the
desperate fighting and severe marching in the unhealthy regions of
the Chickahominy and afterwards, during the second Bull Run campaign;
its trains, administrative services and supplies were disorganised or
lacking in consequence of the rapidity and manner of its removal from
the Peninsula, as well as from the nature of its operations during
the second Bull Run campaign.
"Had General Lee remained in front of Washington (south of the
Potomac) it would have been the part of wisdom to hold our own army
quiet until its pressing wants were fully supplied, its organisation
was restored, and its ranks were filled with recruits--in brief,
until it was prepared for a campaign. But as the enemy maintained the
offensive, and crossed the Upper Potomac to threaten or invade
Pennsylvania, it became necessary to meet him at any cost,
notwithstanding the condition of the troops, to put a stop to the
invasion, to save Baltimore and Washington, and throw him back across
the Potomac.
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