It may well be
questioned whether a vigorous endeavour, supported by all the means
available, and even by troops drawn from the West, to defeat the Army
of the Potomac and to capture Washington, would not have been a more
efficacious means to the same end; but Davis and his Cabinet
consistently preferred dispersion to concentration, and, indeed, the
situation of the South was such as might well have disturbed the
strongest brains. The sea-power of the Union was telling with deadly
effect. Although the most important strategic points on the
Mississippi were still held by Confederate garrisons, nearly every
mile of the great river, from Cairo to New Orleans, was patrolled by
the Federal gunboats; and in deep water, from the ports of the
Atlantic to the roadsteads of the Gulf, the frigates maintained their
vigilant blockade.
Even on the northern border there was hardly a gleam of light across
the sky. The Federal forces were still formidable in numbers, and a
portion of the Army of the Potomac had not been involved in Pope's
defeat. It was possible, therefore, that more skilful generalship
than had yet been displayed by the Northern commanders might deprive
the Confederates of all chance of winning a decisive victory.
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