They had done their
duty in more than one battle, they had been long absent from their
farms, their equipment was worn out, the enemy had been driven from
Virginia, and they considered that they were fully entitled to some
short repose. And amongst these, whose only fault was an imperfect
sense of their military obligations, was the residue of cowards and
malingerers shed by every great army engaged in protracted operations.
Lee had been joined by the divisions of D.H. Hill, McLaws, Walker,
and by Hampton's cavalry, and the strength of his force should have
been 65,000 effectives.* (* Calculated on the basis of the Field
Returns dated July 20, 1862, with the addition of Jackson's and
Ewell's divisions, and subtracting the losses (10,000) of the
campaign against Pope.) But it was evident that these numbers could
not be long maintained. The men were already accustomed to
half-rations of green corn, and they would be no worse off in
Maryland and Pennsylvania, untouched as yet by the ravages of war,
than in the wasted fields of Virginia. The most ample commissariat,
however, would not compensate for the want of boots and the want of
rest, and a campaign of invasion was certain to entail an amount of
hard marching to which the strength of the troops was hardly equal.
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