This letter I have not felt
justified in quoting. In the first place, it lacks corroboration; in
the second place, it contains a very incomplete statement of a large
strategical question; in the third place, the opinions put in
Jackson's mouth are not only contradictory, but altogether at
variance with his practice; and lastly, it attributes certain ideas
to the general--raising "the black flag." etc.--which his
confidential aid officers declare that he never for a moment
entertained.) The fierce battles round Richmond and Manassas he had
looked upon as merely the prelude to more resolute efforts. After he
had defeated Banks at Winchester he had urged his friend Colonel
Boteler to inform the authorities that, if they would reinforce him,
he would undertake to capture Washington. The message had been
conveyed to Lee. "Tell General Jackson," was the reply of the
Commander-in-Chief, "that he must first help me to drive these people
away from Richmond." This object had been now thoroughly
accomplished, and General Lee's decision to redeem his promise was by
none more heartily approved than by the leader of the Valley army.
And yet, though the risks of the venture were small, the prospects of
complete success were dubious.
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