Their tactics had been essentially
offensive, and it is noteworthy that their victories had not been
dearly purchased. If we compare them with those of the British in the
Peninsula, we shall find that with no greater loss than Wellington
incurred in the defensive engagements of three years, 1810, 1811,
1812, the Confederates had attacked and routed armies far larger in
proportion than those which Wellington had merely repulsed.* (*
Wellington's losses in the battles of these three years were 33,000.
The Confederates lost 23,000 in the Valley and the Seven Days and
10,000 in the campaign against Pope. It is not to be understood,
however, that the Duke's strategy was less skilful or less audacious
than Lee's and Jackson's. During these three years his army, largely
composed of Portuguese and Spaniards, was incapable of offensive
tactics against his veteran enemies, and he was biding his time. It
was the inefficiency of his allies and the miserable support he
received from the English Government that prevented him, until 1813,
from adopting a bolder policy.)
But if they had shown that the best defence lies in a vigorous
offensive, their offensive had not yet been applied at the decisive
point.
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