But the campaign, so far as it had
progressed, had shown, if indeed history had not already made it
sufficiently clear, that opportunities for such tactics were not
likely to occur. The Federal generals had consistently refused to run
their heads against earthworks. Their overwhelming numbers would
enable them to turn any position, however formidable; and the only
chance of success lay in keeping these numbers apart and in
preventing them from combining.
It was by strategic and tactical counterstrokes that the recent
victories had been won. Although it had awaited attack within its own
frontier, the Army of Northern Virginia had but small experience of
defensive warfare. With the exception of the actions round Yorktown,
of Cross Keys, and of the Second Manassas, the battles had been
entirely aggressive. The idea that a small army, opposed to one
vastly superior, cannot afford to attack because the attack is
costly, and that it must trust for success to favourable ground, had
been effectually dispelled. Lee and Jackson had taught the
Southerners that the secret of success lies not in strong positions,
but in the concentration, by means of skilful strategy, of superior
numbers on the field of battle.
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