For three days he had only received news
of the main army at long and uncertain intervals. For two of these
days his information of the enemy's movements was very small. While
he was marching to Bristoe Station, Pope, for all he knew, might have
been marching against Longstreet with his whole force. When he
attacked King on the 28th the Federals, in what strength he knew not,
still held Thoroughfare Gap; when he formed for action on the 29th he
was still ignorant of what had happened to the main body, and it was
on the bare chance that Longstreet would force the passage that he
accepted battle with far superior numbers.
It is not difficult to imagine how a general like Ney, placed in
Jackson's situation, would have trimmed and hesitated: how in his
march to Manassas, when he had crossed the mountains and left the Gap
behind him, he would have sent out reconnaissances in all directions,
halting his troops until he learned the coast was clear; how he would
have dashed at the Junction by the shortest route; how he would have
forced his weary troops northward when the enemy's approach was
reported; how, had he reached Sudley Springs, he would have hugged
the shelter of the woods and let King's division pass unmolested;
and, finally, when Pope's columns converged on his position, have
fallen back on Thoroughfare or Aldie.
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