Furthermore, in rear of the Fifth Corps, and at an oblique angle to
the front, ran the line of supply, the railway to West Point. If
Porter's right were turned, the Confederates, threatening the
railway, would compel McClellan to detach largely to the north bank
of the Chickahominy in order to recover or protect the line.
On the north bank of the Chickahominy, therefore, Lee's attention had
been for some time fixed. Here was his adversary's weak point, and a
sudden assault on Porter, followed up, if necessary, by an advance
against the railway, would bring McClellan out of his intrenchments,
and force him to fight at a disadvantage. To ensure success, however,
in the attack on Porter it was necessary to concentrate an
overwhelming force on the north bank; and this could hardly be done
without so weakening the force which held the Richmond lines that it
would be unable to resist the attack of the 75,000 men who faced it.
If McClellan, while Lee was fighting Porter, boldly threw forward the
great army he had on the south bank, the rebel capital might be the
reward of his resolution. The danger was apparent to all, but Lee
resolved to risk it, and his audacity has not escaped criticism.
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