Indeed the general we had placed in the easy chair at
Washington, over George, declared it as his solemn conviction that
Richmond was not to be taken in any such way. That an army so near
Richmond could not take it with advantage. That objective points
must be reached over the right road, not the wrong one. That General
George, having taken his army to Richmond over the wrong road, must
bring it back over the same wrong road, and then proceed on his
travels over the right road. That Richmond, unless approached over
the right road could not be taken in the right way. That General
George had deceived us, inasmuch as his plan had too much strategy
in it, and not enough straight lines. That Richmond, to be taken in
the right way, must be taken by a new general, with a new army, and
according to new ideas. That it was better to keep Washington from
being taken than to take Richmond, though we had a large army
knocking at its gates. This was the military logic of our new
Commander-in-Chief. And this was the great Commander-in-Chief who
was to conduct the war for us on enlarged principles and keep the
nation safe against blunders.
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