By virtue of this very principle it cannot extend
one inch beyond its own territorial limits. A State cannot regulate
the relation of master and slave, of owner and property, the manner and
title of descent, or anything else, one inch beyond its territory. Then
you cannot, by virtue of the law of slavery, if it makes slaves property
in a State, if you please, move that property out of the State. It ends
whenever you pass from that State. You may pass into another State that
has a like law; and if you do, you hold it by virtue of that law; but
the moment you pass beyond the limits of the slaveholding States, all
title to the property called property in slaves, there ends. Under such
a law slaves cannot be carried as property into the Territories, or
anywhere else beyond the States authorizing it. It is not property
anywhere else. If the Constitution of the United States gives any other
and further character than this to slave property, let us acknowledge it
fairly and end all strife about it. If it does not, I ask in all candor,
that men on the other side shall say so, and let this point be
settled. What is the point we are to inquire into? It is this: does
the Constitution of the United States make slaves property beyond the
jurisdiction of the States authorizing slavery? If it only acknowledges
them as property within that jurisdiction, it has not extended the
property one inch beyond the State line; but if, as the Supreme Court
seems to say, it does recognize and protect them as property further
than State limits, and more than the State laws do, then, indeed, it
becomes like other property.
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