And judgment, directly opposed to it, was taken to be
the faculty of discerning differences in objects that are
superficially alike. (Between this idea of wit as discovering likeness
in things unlike, and the Platonic idea of discovering the One in the
Many, the Augustans made no connection.) A similar distinction between
wit and judgment was made by Charleton, Robert Boyle, John Locke, and
many others. The full implication lying in Hobbes's definition can be
seen in Walter Charleton, who said (_Brief Discourse_, pp. 20-21) that
imagination (or wit) is the faculty by which "we conceive some certain
similitude in objects really unlike, and pleasantly confound them in
discourse: Which by its unexpected Fineness and allusion, surprizing
the Hearer, renders him less curious of the truth of what is said." In
short, wit is delightful, but, because it leads away from truth,
unprofitable and, it may be, even dangerous.
The identification of wit with fancy gave it a lowly role in Augustan
thinking; and also in literary prose, which was supposed to be the
language of reason (cf. Donald F. Bond, "'Distrust' of Imagination in
English Neo-Classicism," _PQ_, XIV, 54-69). What of its
position in poetry? According to Hobbes, poetry must exhibit both
judgment and fancy, but fancy should dominate; and the work of fancy
is to adorn discourse with tropes and figures, to please by
extravagance, to disguise meaning, and to create pleasant
illusions.
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